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April 29, 2014
Abstract
We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games
with precedence constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE),
boundedness (BOUND), covariance under strategic equivalence, closedness (CLOS), the reduced game
property (RGP), the reconfirmation property (RCP) for suitably generalized Davis-Maschler reduced
games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of all
bounded faces of the positive core, is characterized similarly. Just RCP has to be replaced by a
suitable weaker axiom, a weak version of CRGP (the converse RGP) has to be added, and CLOS
can be deleted. For classical games the prenucleolus is the unique further solution that satisfies the
axioms, but for games with precedence constraints it violates NE as well as the prekernel. The positive
prekernel, however, is axiomatized by NE, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak RGP, CRGP, and
weak unanimity for two-person games (WUTPG), and the bounded positive prekernel is axiomatized
similarly by requiring WUTPG only for classical two-person games and adding BOUND.
Keywords: TU games, restricted cooperation, game with precedence constraints, positive core, bounded
core, positive prekernel, prenucleolus
1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Myerson (Myerson 1977) and Faigle (Faigle 1989) introducing the idea of
restricted cooperation, that is, considering the possibility to have unfeasible or forbidden coalitions, many
investigations have been done in order to study or adapt the main solution concepts of classical TU games,
for various structures of the set of feasible coalitions.
Considering a finite set of players N and a collection of feasible coalitions F ⊆ 2N , many structures
borrowed from combinatorial optimization and partially ordered sets have been proposed for F : feasible
coalitions induced by a communication graph (Myerson 1977), distributive lattices (Faigle and Kern 1992),
convex geometries (Bilbao, Lebro´n, and Jime´nez 1998), union-stable systems (Algaba, Bilbao, Borm, and
Lo´pez 2000), antimatroids (Algaba, Bilbao, van den Brink, and Jime´nez-Losada 2004), regular set systems
(Lange and Grabisch 2009), to cite a few (see a survey in Grabisch 2012 ). The case of distributive lattices
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appears to be of special interest since it corresponds by Birkhoff’s theorem to a situation which is often
encountered in practice: the presence of a hierarchy, or any kind of partial order , on the set of players
N . In this case, feasible coalitions are those satisfying the following rule: if player i is present, then any
of its subordinates j ≺ i must be present (this is called by Faigle and Kern “precedence constraints”).
Moreover, the set of feasible coalitions is closed under union and intersection. For these reasons, we
precisely focus in this paper on this type of structure.
Considering that F is a distributive lattice induced by some partial order on N , the core of games on
such structures has already deserved much attention, and many results valid for classical games have
been extended to this case, in particular, the Shapley-Ichiishi theorem (Shapley 1971, Ichiishi 1981)
characterizing convex TU games (Derks and Gilles 1995, Grabisch and Sudho¨lter 2014). The essential
difference with classical games is that a nonempty core is always (unless F = 2N ) unbounded, however
it is pointed. Extremal rays of the core have been found by Tomizawa (1983), and bounded facets have
been studied by Grabisch (2011). The set of all bounded facets of the core, called the bounded core, has
been studied and axiomatized by Grabisch and Sudho¨lter (2012). From the interpretation point of view,
it is the set of core elements for which any player takes the maximum from its subordinates.
Other solution concepts like the nucleolus, the kernel, etc. have been much less studied in the context
of restricted cooperation. It is the main purpose of this paper to fill this gap for games with precedence
constraints. Our first aim is to study the positive core (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010), which is closely
related to the prenucleolus. We find that the positive core can be axiomatized in a way which is very close
to the classical case, up to a suitable generalization of the axioms, namely by non-emptiness (NE), rea-
sonableness (REAS), covariance (COV), the reduced game property (RGP), the reconfirmation property
(RCP), nondiscrimination (ND), and closedness (CLOS), the latter permitting to eliminate the relative
interior of the positive core as a candidate for the solution. The positive core being unbounded unless
F = 2N , we propose likewise the bounded positive core, which has the same intuitive interpretation as for
the bounded core. We find that it can be axiomatized by NE, COV, RGP, RCP restricted to classical
games, ND, boundedness (BOUND), and a variant of the converse reduced game property, called RCRGP.
The bounded positive core contains a particular point, which can be considered as the prenucleolus of
the game, since it coincides with the usual prenucleolus when F = 2N . It lexicographically minimizes
the excesses of all coalitions in F the complements of which are also in F , and then lexicographically
maximizes the remaining excesses so that they are non-positive (thereby keeping the idea that players
should take the maximum of their subordinates, while guaranteeing minimal losses if any). Lastly, we
study the prekernel. A simple consideration shows that the classical definition of the prekernel leads to
an empty set as soon as F 6= 2N . We propose therefore to study the positive prekernel instead (Sudho¨lter
and Peleg 2000), which contains the positive core. We show that it is characterized by NE, anonymity
(AN), REAS, a weak RGP property, CRGP, and weak unanimity for 2-persons games (WUTPG).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the basic material on partially ordered sets, the core,
and the bounded core of games with precedence constraints. Section 3 introduces the positive core,
which is axiomatized in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the bounded positive core and introduces the
prenucleolus, for which a Kohlberg-like criterion is given. The positive prekernel and its axiomatization
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are addressed in Section 6, and Section 7 studies the logical independence of all the axioms introduced
in the various axiomatizations.
2 Notation, Definitions, and Preliminaries
A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair (P,) such that P is a nonempty finite set and  is a partial
order on P , i.e., a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on P . As usual, we write x  y
for (x, y) ∈  and use x ≺ y if x  y and x 6= y. If x ≺ y and there is no z ∈ P such that x ≺ z ≺ y then
y covers x, denoted by x ≺· y. A chain in (P,) is a sequence (x0, . . . , xq) such that x0 ≺ · · · ≺ xq where
q is called the length of the chain. The height of a poset is the length of a longest chain. The height of
x ∈ P , denoted by h(x), is the maximal length of a chain from a minimal element to x.
Let U , |U | > 3, be a set, the universe of players. A coalition is a finite nonempty subset of U . Let N
be a coalition and (N,) be a poset. Then S ⊆ N is a downset of (N,) if i ∈ S and j  i implies
j ∈ S. Denote by O(N,) the set of downsets of (N,). Note that (O(N,),⊆) is a distributive lattice
of height1 |N |. By Birkhoff’s representation theorem the opposite statement is also true: If F ⊆ 2N and
(F ,⊆) is a distributive lattice of height |N |, then there exists a poset (N,) such that F = O(N,).
A (cooperative TU) game with precedence constraints (see Faigle and Kern (1992)) is a triple (N,, v)
such that N is a coalition, (N,) is a poset, and v : O(N,) → R, v(∅) = 0. Note that a classical TU
game is a pair (N, v) such that v : 2N → R, v(∅) = 0. Hence, we may identify a game (N, v) with (N,, v)
where (N,) is the poset of height 0. Let Γ denote the set of TU games with precedence constraints.
Throughout this section let (N,, v) be a game with precedence constraints and denote F = O(N,).
Let
X∗(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) 6 v(N)} and X(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N)}
denote the set of feasible and Pareto efficient feasible payoffs (preimputations), respectively. We use
x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi (x(∅) = 0) for every S ∈ 2
N and every x ∈ RN as a convention. Additionally, xS denotes
the restriction of x to S, i.e. xS = (xi)i∈S , and we write x = (xS , xN\S).
The core of (N,, v), denoted by C(N,, v), is defined by
C(N,, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and x(S) > v(S) for all S ∈ F}. (2.1)
By its definition, the core of (N,, v) is a convex polyhedral set. It is well known (see Derks and Gilles
(1995)) that it does not contain lines. More precisely,
C(N,, v) = conv(ext(C(N,, v))) + C(N,, 0), (2.2)
where “conv” means “convex hull”, “ext” means “set of extreme points”, and “+” denotes “Minkowski
sum”. For any S ⊆ N, let NχS = χS ∈ RN be the indicator function of S, i,e. χSi = 1 for i ∈ S and χ
S
j = 0
1A poset (P,) is a lattice if for any x, y ∈ P their supremum, denoted x ∧ y, and infimum, denoted x ∨ y, exist. A
lattice is distributive if ∧ and ∨ satisfy distributivity.
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for j ∈ N \ S. If (N,, v) is a classical game, i.e., if the height of (N,) is 0, then C(N,, 0) = {0}.
Otherwise, i.e., if there exists a pair (i, j) ∈ N such that i ≺ j, then (see Derks and Gilles (1995))
C(N,, 0) = cone({χ{i} − χ{j} | i, j ∈ N, i ≺ j}), (2.3)
where “cone” denotes “convex cone generated by”. For i ≺ j, say i = i0 ≺· · · · ≺· ik = j,
χ{i} − χ{j} =
k−1∑
ℓ=0
χ{iℓ} − χ{iℓ+1}
so that
C(N,, 0) = cone({χ{i} − χ{j} | i, j ∈ N, i ≺· j}) (2.4)
(also shown by Tomizawa (1983), see also Fujishige (2005, Th. 3.26)).
The bounded core of (N,, v), denoted by Cb(N,, v), is the set of all elements x ∈ C(N,, v) that satisfy
the following condition for any i, j ∈ N with i ≺· j: There is no ε > 0 such that x + ε
(
χ{j} − χ{i}
)
∈
C(N,, v). Hence,
Cb(N,, v) = {x ∈ C(N,, v) | ({x} − C(N,, 0)) ∩ C(N,, v) = {x}}.
Therefore, if (N,, v) is a classical game, the bounded core coincides with the classical core.
Remark 2.1 According to Rockafellar (1970, Section 18) a closed convex set is the disjoint union of
the relative interiors of its faces. Hence, any element of Cb(N,, v) is in the interior of some face of
C(N,, v). We conclude that Cb(N,, v) is the disjoint union of the relative interiors of the bounded
faces of C(N,, v), i.e., Cb(N,, v) is the union of all bounded faces of C(N,, v). Thus, the bounded
core is connected.
The bounded core may be non-convex and, hence, a proper subset of the convex hull of the extreme
points of the core (called “convex part of the core”) even if the poset is connected as Example 2.2 shows.
We say that i, j ∈ S ⊆ N are connected in (S,) if there is a path in S that connects i and j, that is,
if there exist k ∈ N and i1, . . . , ik ∈ N such that i = i1, j = ik, and, for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k − 1, either
iℓ ≺ iℓ+1 or iℓ+1 ≺ iℓ. Any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N may be partitioned into its connected components, and S ⊆ N is
connected if S = ∅ or S consists of a single component.
Example 2.2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and (N,, v) be defined by i ≺ 4 for i ∈ T = {1, 2, 3} and, for S ∈ F ,
v(S) = 6 if |S ∩ T | = 2, v(N) = 12, and v(S) = 0, otherwise. Then (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), (6, 6, 0, 0) ∈
Cb(N,, v), but the convex midpoint of these points x = (4, 4, 4, 0) /∈ Cb(N,, v) because (2, 4, 4, 2) ∈
C(N,, v), which can be obtained from (4, 4, 4, 0) by a transfer (−2, 0, 0, 2).
One can show that the vertices of Cb(N,, v) are (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), (6, 6, 0, 0) and (3, 3, 3, 3). Then,
the bounded core is the union of the three segments between (3, 3, 3, 3) and each of the vertices (0, 6, 6, 0),
(6, 0, 6, 0), and (6, 6, 0, 0). Indeed, any point in the segment between (3, 3, 3, 3) and (0, 6, 6, 0) has the form
(3α,−3α+6,−3α+6, 3α), and any transfer ε(χ{4}−χ{i}) for i ≺ 4 would lead to a point outside the core.
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The same conclusion holds for the two other segments by symmetry. Now, consider the point (3, 3, 5, 1),
which is the midpoint of (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0) and (3, 3, 3, 3). Observe that a transfer (0, 0,−2, 2) on this
point would give (3, 3, 3, 3) ∈ C(N,, v), hence it does not belong to the bounded core. By symmetry
again, any point in the relative interior of the convex hull of (3, 3, 3, 3) and any two of the vertices
(0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), and (6, 6, 0, 0) is outside the bounded core.
For any S ∈ F and x ∈ RN , let e(S, x, v) = v(S)− x(S) be the excess at x.
For any α ∈ R the α-core of (N,, v), denoted by Cα(N,, v), is the set
Cα(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | e(S, x, v) 6 α∀S ∈ F \ {∅, N}}.
The following lemma follows from Lemma 3.2 of Grabisch and Sudho¨lter (2012).
Lemma 2.3 If (N,) is connected (i.e., N consists of a unique connected component) and α ∈ R, then
Cα(N,, v) 6= ∅ and Cα(N,, v) = conv(ext(Cα(N,, v))) + C(N,, 0).
Proof: Let w differ from v only inasmuch as w(S) = v(S)+α for all S ∈ F\{∅, N}. By the aforementioned
lemma, C(N,, w) 6= ∅. As C(N,, w) = Cα(N,, v), the proof is finished by (2.2). q.e.d.
Let (N,∗) be the reverse partially ordered set (i.e., i ∗ j iff j  i). Note that O(N,∗) = {S ⊆
N | N \ S ∈ F}. Hence, (N,) is connected iff (N,∗) is connected. The dual game of (N,, v) is the
game (N,∗, v∗) defined by v∗(S) = v(N) − v(N \ S) for all S ∈ O(N,∗). As for classical games, if
x ∈ X(N, v) and S ∈ O(N,∗), then
e(S, x, v∗) = v∗(S)− x(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S)− x(N) + x(N \ S) = −e(N \ S, x, v). (2.5)
Hence
C−α(N,
∗, v∗) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | e(S, x, v) > α∀S ∈ F \ {∅, N}} for all α ∈ R. (2.6)
In order to generalize Lemma 2.3 to games that do not necessarily have a connected hierarchy, we define
the intermediate game (see Owen (1977) for a similar construction) of (N,, v) as follows. Denote by
R(N,) = R the partition ofN whose elements are the connected components of N . In the present context
R is considered as natural set of “a priori unions” and not a “coalition structure” a` la Aumann and Dre`ze
(1974), i.e., we do not consider “component feasible” payoffs. The intermediate game of (N,, v) is the
classical TU game (R, vR) defined by vR(T ) = v (
⋃
T ) for all T ⊆ R. Let O0(N,) = F0 be the subset
of all elements of F that are not unions of connected components. Hence, F \F0 = {
⋃
T | T ⊆ R}. Now,
for any y ∈ X (R, vR) and α ∈ R define the α-core w.r.t. y, Cα,y(N,, v), by
Cα,y(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | x(T ) = yT∀T ∈ R and e(S, x, v) 6 α∀S ∈ F0}.
By slightly abusing notation, for any S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, the sub-poset of (N,) on S, i.e., the intersection
of  and S × S, is denoted by (S,). Note that R(S,) = {T ∩ S | T ∈ R} \ {∅}, which we denote by
R(S) for simplicity. Similarly we denote for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , the sublattice O(S,) = {T ∩ S | T ∈ F}
simply by F(S).
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Proposition 2.4 For any game (N,, v) with precedence constraints, any preimputation y of the inter-
mediate game (R, vR), and any α ∈ R,
Cα,y(N,, v) 6= ∅ and Cα,y(N,, v) = conv(ext(Cα,y(N,, v))) + C(N,, 0).
Proof: Let F0 = O0(N,) and R = R(N ,). To show non-emptiness we construct the components of
some x ∈ Cα,y(N,, v) as follows. Let β > (−α)+max{v(S) | S ∈ F0}−min{y(T ) | T ⊆ R} and β > 0.
For Q ∈ R define (Q,, vQ) by
vQ(S) =


0 , if S = ∅,
yQ , if S = Q,
β , if S ∈ F(Q) \ {∅, Q}.
As (Q,) is connected there exists xQ ∈ C(Q,, vQ) by Lemma 2.3. Hence, x(Q) = yQ for all Q ∈ R.
Let S ∈ F0 and T̂ = {Q ∈ R | Q ⊆ S}. Then there exists Q̂ ∈ R such that ∅ 6= Q̂ ∩ S 6= S. As β > 0,
x(S) = x(S ∩ Q̂) + x(S \ Q̂) > β + y(T̂ ) > −α+ v(S) + max{−y(T ) | T ⊆ R}+ y(T̂ ) > −α+ v(S).
Hence v(S)− x(S) 6 α.
The observation that z(Q) = 0 for any z ∈ C(N,, 0) and any Q ∈ R implies the second statement of
the proposition. q.e.d.
Note that for any y ∈ X (R, vR),
C−α,y(N,
∗, v∗) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | x(T ) = yT∀T ∈ R, e(S, x, v) > α∀S ∈ F0} for all α ∈ R. (2.7)
3 The positive core
In order to expand the definition of the positive core (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010) to TU games with
precedence constraints, we employ and recall Justman’s (1977) notion of the “generalized nucleolus”
(Schmeidler 1969).
Let D be a finite nonempty set, X be a set, let h : X → RD, and denote d := |D|. Define θ : X → Rd by
θt(x) = max
T⊆D,|T |=t
min
i∈T
hi(x) for all x ∈ X and all t = 1, . . . , d,
that is, for any x ∈ X , θ(x) is the vector, whose components are the numbers hi(x), i ∈ D, arranged
in non-increasing order. Let ≥lex denote the lexicographical order of R
d. The nucleolus of h w.r.t. X ,
NUC(h,X), is defined by
NUC(h,X) = {x ∈ X | θ(y) ≥lex θ(x) for all y ∈ X}.
Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, F = O(N,),R = R(N,), and recall that F \ F0 = {
⋃
T | T ⊆ R} . For x ∈ RN and
S ∈ F denote e(S, x, v) = v(S)−x(S) (the excess of v at x). Then the positive core of (N,, v), denoted
by C+(N,, v), is defined by
C+(N,, v) = NUC((e(S, ·, v)+)S∈F , X
∗(N, v))
6
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where t+ = max{0, t} for t ∈ R. Let x ∈ C+(N,, v). Then x ∈ X(N, v) (otherwise there are positive
excesses and all of them could be diminished) and, e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0 (otherwise, if e(S, x, v) > 0
for some S ∈ F0, then there exist ℓ 6∈ S ∋ k, k ≺· ℓ, and one could diminish this excess and the excesses
of all S′ ∈ F0, ℓ 6∈ S′ ∋ k, by a transfer t(χ{k} − χ{ℓ}), t > 0, without changing the excesses of further
coalitions). We conclude that
C+(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | (x(Q))Q∈R ∈ C+(R, vR) and e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0}. (3.1)
It is well-known that for a classical TU game (N, v) the prenucleolus, i.e., the set
NUC((e(S, ·, v))S⊆N , X
∗(N, v)),
consists of a single element ν(N, v) (the prenucleolus point) and that
C+(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | e(S, x, v)+ = e(S, ν(N, v), v)+ for all S ⊆ N}. (3.2)
Now, let ν be the prenucleolus point of the intermediate game (R, vR) and define (N,, w) by w (
⋃
T ) =
ν(T ) for all T ⊆ R such that e(T , ν, vR) > 0 and w(S) = v(S) for all other S ∈ F . By (3.2),
C+(N,, v) = C(N,, w) so that, by (2.2),
C+(N,, v) = conv(ext(C(N,, w))) + C(N,, 0)
and we may define the bounded positive core by
Cb+(N,, v) = C
b(N,, w). (3.3)
Remark 3.1 The variant of the “Kohlberg (1971) criterion” for the positive core of classical games is
still valid. For (N,, v) ∈ Γ and x ∈ RN and α ∈ R let D(α, x, v) = {N} ∪ {S ∈ F | e(S, x, v) > α}
where F = O(N,, v). Recall that D ⊆ 2N is balanced if there are balancing coefficients for D, i.e., there
are δS > 0, S ∈ D such that
∑
S∈D δSχ
S = χN . If x ∈ X(N, v), then following statements are equivalent
(Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010, Theorem 3.4):
x ∈ C+(N,, v) (3.4)
α > 0, y ∈ RN , y(N) = 0, y(S) > 0∀S ∈ D(α, x, v) =⇒ y(S) = 0∀S ∈ D(α, x, v) (3.5)
α > 0 =⇒ D(α, x, v) is balanced (3.6)
We also note that the definitions of the classical bargaining set and its variants use the notion of “indi-
vidual” objections. In a TU game (N,, v) with precedence constraints a player ℓ ∈ N has no objection
against any of her subordinates k ≺ ℓ so that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler pre-bargaining set (Aumann
and Maschler 1964, Davis and Maschler 1967), the reactive pre-bargaining set (Granot 1994), and the
semireactive pre-bargaining set (Sudho¨lter and Potters 2001) consist of all preimputations x so that
(x(Q))Q∈R belongs to the respective pre-bargaining set of the intermediate game (R, vR) and, moreover,
e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0. For the Mas-Colell pre-bargaining (Mas-Colell 1989) of (N,, v) we only
have one inclusion: If (y(Q))Q∈R belongs to the Mas-Colell pre-bargaining set of the intermediate game
and if e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0, then y belongs to the Mas-Colell pre-bargaining set of (N,, v).
However, the positive core is a subset of any of the mentioned pre-bargaining sets.
7
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4 Characterizing the positive core
On classical games the prenucleolus and the positive core are the unique solutions that satisfy a collection
of plausible properties. In this section we show that the positive core on the set of TU games with
precedence constraints is characterized by these axioms.
We first recall the mentioned axioms of a solution. Let F = O(N,) wherever it occurs in this section.
Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , x ∈ RN , and let π : N → N be a bijection (a permutation of N). The
reduced game of (N,, v) w.r.t. S and x is the game (S,, vS,x) defined by
vS,x(T ) =


0 , if T = ∅,
v(N)− x(N \ S) , if T = S,
max{v(P )− x(P \ T ) | P ∈ F , P ∩ S = T } , if T ∈ F(S) \ {∅, S}.
(4.1)
The permutation π is a symmetry of (N,, v) if {π(S) | S ∈ F} = F and v(π(S)) = v(S) for all S ∈ F .
Let SYM(N,, v) denote the set of symmetries.
A solution is a mapping σ that assigns a subset σ(N,, v) of X∗(N, v) to any (N,, v) ∈ Γ. Its restriction
to a set Γ′ ⊆ Γ is again denoted by σ. Moreover, a solution on Γ′ is the restriction to Γ′ of some solution.
A solution σ on Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
• non-emptiness (NE) if σ(N,, v) 6= ∅ for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′;
• Pareto optimality (PO) if σ(N,, v) ⊆ X(N, v) for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′;
• Covariance under strategic equivalence (COV) if, for all (N,, v), (N,, w) ∈ Γ′, α > 0, and β ∈
R
N , the following holds: If w(S) = αv(S)+β(S) for all S ∈ F , then σ(N,, w) = ασ(N,, v)+β;
• Anonymity (AN) if, for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ and all injective mappings π : N → U the following
holds: If (π(N),′, πv) ∈ Γ′, where π(i) ′ π(j) iff i  j, (πv)(π(S)) = v(S) for all S ⊆ F , and
π(x) = y ∈ Rπ(N) is defined by yπ(i) = xi∀x ∈ R
N , ∀i ∈ N , then σ(π(N),′, πv) = π(σ(N,, v));
• Boundedness (BOUND) if σ(N,, v) is a bounded set for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′;
• reasonableness (REAS) if, for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ and all x ∈ σ(N,, v) the following property holds
for each minimal element k and each maximal element ℓ in N :
xk > min{v(S ∪ {k})− v(S) | S ∈ F , k /∈ S} and xℓ 6 max{v(S)− v(S \ {ℓ}) | S ∈ F , ℓ ∈ S};
• closedness (CLOS) if σ(N,, v) is a closed set for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′;
• reduced game property (RGP) if the following condition holds: If (N,, v) ∈ Γ′, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, and
x ∈ σ(N,, v), then (S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ′ and xS ∈ σ(S,, vS,x);
• reconfirmation property (RCP) if the following condition holds for every (N,, v) ∈ Γ′, every
x ∈ σ(N,, v), and every ∅ 6= S ⊆ N : If (S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ
′ and yS ∈ σ(S,, vS,x), then (yS , xN\S) ∈
σ(N,, v);
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• the possibility of nondiscrimination (ND) if, for every (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ with σ(N,, v) 6= ∅, there
exists x ∈ σ(N,, v) such that π(x) = x for all π ∈ SYM(N,, v), i.e., x is invariant under all
symmetries.
NE, PO, BOUND and CLOS are self-explanatory. COV means that the solution should not depend
on a change of unit and an initial endowment to the players. AN means that the solution should be
independent of the labeling of the players. REAS means that any player k corresponding to a minimal
element in the hierarchy should receive at least her minimal marginal contribution (in particular, at least
v({k})), while a player ℓ being a maximal element should not receive more than her maximal marginal
contribution (in particular, not more than v(N)−v(N \{ℓ})). RGP means that if x is a solution element,
then its restriction to a subset S should be an element of the solution of the corresponding reduced game.
RCP means that from a solution element x and a solution element y of the reduced game on S, one can
build another solution element by concatenating y and xN\S . Lastly, ND means that it is possible to find
a solution element invariant under all symmetries of the game, and thus not favoring any player.
Remark 4.1 (1) Let Γfree be the set of classical TU games2. We recall (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010,
Theorem 4.1) that, if |U | = ∞, there there are precisely three solutions on Γfree that satisfy NE,
REAS, COV, RGP, RCP, and ND, namely the prenucleolus, the positive core C+, or its relative
interior rint C+. Here, for (N,, v) ∈ Γ and with R = R
(N,),
rint C+(N,, v) =

x ∈ C+(N, v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
e(S, x, v) < 0 for S ∈ F0 or S =
⋃
T for some
T ⊆ R such that e(T , ν(R, vR), vR) < 0

 . (4.2)
For classical TU games, the foregoing set is nonempty because it contains the prenucleous point.
Hence, by Proposition 2.4 it is also nonempty in the general case so that it indeed coincides with
the relative interior of the positive core.
(2) Note that C+ satisfies REAS. Indeed, let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, x ∈ X(N, v), and k, ℓ ∈ N such that
k is minimal and ℓ is maximal. If xk < t := minS∈F ,k/∈S v(S ∪ {k}) − v(S), then choose ε > 0
such that xk + (|N | − 1)ε < t, define y ∈ X(N, v) by yk = xk + (|N | − 1)ε and yi = xi − ε for
all i ∈ N \ {k} and let S ∈ F \ {∅, N}. If k ∈ S, then e(S, y, v) ≤ e(S, x, v) − ε and if k /∈ S,
then e(S, y, v) < e(S ∪ {k}, x, v). As e({k}, x, v) > 0, x /∈ C+(N,, v). Similarly it is shown that
xℓ > maxS∈F ,ℓ∈S v(S)− v(S \ {ℓ} implies that x /∈ C+(N,, v).
(3) It is straightforward to verify that C+ on any Γ
′ ⊆ Γ satisfies NE, PO, COV, AN, and CLOS.
We say that Γ′ ⊆ Γ is closed under reduction if, for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, and x ∈ X(N, v),
(S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ′.
Lemma 4.2 Let Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
(1) If Γ′ is closed under reduction, then both C+ and rint C+ on Γ
′ satisfy RGP.
2When cooperation is not restricted, i.e., all coalitions are feasible, we call a game unrestricted (free).
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(2) Both C+ and rint C+ on Γ
′ satisfy RCP.
Proof: For C+, Remark 3.1 (3.5) implies (see Theorem 6.3.14 of Peleg and Sudho¨lter 2007) RGP, and
in order to show RCP the relevant part of the proof of Theorem 6.3.14 of RCP may be literally copied.
In the case of rint C+ we may proceed similarly as before to show RGP. The “Kohlberg criterion” has
to be modified only inasmuch as α > 0 has to be replaced by α > 0 in (3.5) and (3.6).
In order to show that rint C+ satisfies RCP, let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, x ∈ rint C+(N,, v), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N ,
y ∈ rint C+(S,, vS,x), T ∈ F = O(N,), and put z = (y, xN\S). We have to show that e(T, z, v) 6
e(T, x, v)+ and that e(T, x, v) < 0 implies e(T, z, v) < 0. If x(T∩S) = y(T∩S), then e(T, x, v) = e(T, z, v).
Hence, we may assume that y(T ∩ S) 6= x(T ∩ S). Therefore T ∩ S ∈ F(S) \ {∅, S}. Let P ⊆ N \ S
such that (T ∩ S) ∪ P ∈ F and vS,x(T ∩ S) = v((T ∩ S)∪ P )− x(P ). By definition of the reduced game,
e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, z, v) > e(T, z, v). If e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, z, v) > 0 or e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, x, v) > 0, then by RCP
of C+, e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, z, v) = e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, x, v) so that x(T ∩ S) = y(T ∩ S) which was excluded. If
e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, z, v) = 0, then e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, x, v) < 0 so that e(S ∩ T, xS , vS,x) < 0 = e(S ∩ T, y, vS,x) so
that y /∈ rint C+(S,, vS,x) by RGP of rint C+. q.e.d.
Lemma 4.3 On any Γ′ ⊆ Γ the positive core satisfies ND.
Proof: For any (N,, v) ∈ Γ′, x ∈ C+(N,, v), and π ∈ SYM(N , v), by AN also π(x) ∈ C+(N,, v).
By convexity of the positive core, y =
∑
π∈ SYM(N,,v)
π(x)
|SYM(N,,v)| ∈ C+(N,, v). Finally, y is
invariant under symmetries. q.e.d.
Lemma 4.4 If σ is a solution that satisfies REAS and RGP, then e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ, x ∈
σ(N,, v), and all S ∈ O0(N,).
Proof: Let x ∈ σ(N,, v), T ∈ O0(N,), and assume, on the contrary, that e(T, x, v) > 0. Then there
exist k ∈ T and ℓ ∈ N \ T such that k ≺ ℓ. Now, v{k,ℓ},x({k}) > v(T ) − x(T \ {k}) and, by RGP,
x{k,ℓ} ∈ σ({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x) so that REAS is violated. q.e.d.
Lemma 4.5 Let σ be a solution that satisfies RGP. If, for any (N, v) ∈ Γfree, σ(N, v) ⊆ C+(N, v),
and if, for any (N,, v) ∈ Γ and any x ∈ σ(N,, v), e(T, x, v) 6 0 for all T ∈ O0(N,), then σ is a
subsolution of the positive core, i.e., σ(N,, v) ⊆ C+(N,, v) for (N,, v) ∈ Γ.
Proof: Let S ⊆ N such that |Q∩S| = 1 for all Q ∈ R. For any i ∈ S denote Qi the connected component
that contains i. Hence, the mapping S →R, i 7→ Qi for all i ∈ S, is a bijection. As F(S) = 2S, by RGP
and our assumption, xS ∈ C+(S,, vS,x). Now, let y ∈ RR be defined by yQ = x (
⋃
Q) for all Q ∈ R.
Then, for any T ⊆ S, e(T, xS , vS,x)+ = e({Qi | i ∈ T }, y, vR)+. Indeed, vS,x(T ) = v(T ∪ P ) − x(P )
for some P ⊆ N \ S such that T ∪ P ∈ F . If e(T, xS , vS,x) > 0 then T ∪ P must be a union of
connected components, hence T ∪ P =
⋃
i∈T Qi so that the foregoing equation is valid. Conversely, if
e({Qi | i ∈ T }, y, vR) > 0, then e({Qi | i ∈ T }, y, vR) = v(
⋃
i∈T Qi)− x(
⋃
i∈T Qi) 6 e(T, xS , vS,x).
By Remark 3.1 (3.5), y ∈ C+(R, vR). The proof is finished by (3.1). q.e.d.
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Theorem 4.6 Assume that |U | =∞. There is a unique solution that satisfies NE, REAS, COV, CLOS,
RGP, RCP, and ND, and it is the positive core.
Proof: The positive core satisfies the desired axioms by Remark 4.1, Lemma 4.2, and Lemma 4.3.
In order to show the remaining direction, let σ be a solution that satisfies the desired axioms. On Γfree, σ
must be one of the following three solutions (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010, Theorem 4.1): The prenucleolus,
the positive core, or its relative interior. Hence, σ is a subsolution of the positive core by Lemmas 4.4
and 4.5.
Step 1: We claim that, on Γfree, σ is the positive core. In order to show this statement it suffices to
construct a single TU game (M,u) ∈ Γfree such that σ(M,u) \ rint C+(M,u) 6= ∅. For this purpose,
choose any set M ′ of three players, say without loss of generality,M ′ = {1, 2, 3}, and let ′ be defined by
1 ≺′ 2. Moreover, let (M ′,′, u′) ∈ Γ be defined by u′(M) = 2 and u′(S) = 0 for S ∈ F ′ \ {M ′}, where
F ′ = O(M ′,′). Let P = {1, 3}, Q = {2, 3}, and R = {1, 2}. By NE, there exists x ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′).
As x ∈ C+(M ′,′, u′), x1, x3 > 0, x3 6 2, and x(M ′) = 2. Note that all reduced games of (M ′,′, u′)
w.r.t. P or Q belong to Γfree. By RGP, (x2, x3) ∈ σ(Q, u′Q,x). As u
′
Q,x({2}) = −x1, u
′
Q,x({3}) = 0,
(1 − x1, 1) is the prenucleolus of (Q, u′Q,x). As σ(Q, u
′
Q,x) contains the prenucleolus, RCP implies that
y = (x1, 1 − x1, 1) ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′). Now, if x1 = 0, then by RGP (0, 1) ∈ σ(P, u′P,y). However, (0, 1) ∈
C+(P, u
′
P,y) \ rint C+(P, u
′
P,y). If x1 > 0, then by RGP, yR ∈ σ(R,
′, u′R,y). As u
′
R,y({1}) = 0 and
u′R,y(R) = 1, by (translation) COV (x1,−x1) ∈ σ(R,
′, 0) and by (scale) COV, (t,−t) ∈ σ(R,′, 0)
for all t > 0 (choose α = tx1 in the definition of scale COV). By CLOS, (0, 0) ∈ σ(R,
′, 0) so that by
translation COV and RCP, z = (0, 1, 1) ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′). Finally, RGP yields that (0, 1) ∈ σ(P, u′P,z) and
(0, 1) ∈ C+(P, u′P,z) \ rint C+(P, u
′
P,z).
Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ. It remains to show that
C+(N,, v) ⊆ σ(N,, v). (4.3)
Let F = O(N,, v). By Step 1 we may assume that F 6= 2N .
Step 2: We consider the case |N | = 2 first and assume without loss of generality that N = {1, 2} and
1 ≺ 2. By COV we may assume that v(S) = 0 for all S ∈ F . With (M ′,′, u′) defined in Step 1, by NE
there exists y ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′). As in Step 1 we may assume that y3 = 1. By RGP and RCP applied to
R, we may assume that y2 > 0. Furthermore, by RGP and RCP applied to P , we may replace (y1, y3)
by (y1 + y3, 0) ( or by (0, y1 + y3) if necessary because σ(P, u
′
P,y) = C+(P, u
′
P,y)). Thus, there exists
z, z′ ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′) with z1 > 0 and z′1 = 0. By RGP and COV, (z1,−z1), (0, 0) ∈ σ(N,, v) so that by
scale covariance, (t,−t) ∈ σ(N,, v) for all t > 0, i.e., σ(N,, v) = C+(N,, v).
Now the proof of (4.3) can be finished by induction on |N |. For |N | = 1, C+(N,, v) is a singleton so that
(4.3) holds by NE and Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5. For |N | = 2, Step 2 shows (4.3). Assume that (4.3) is proved
whenever |N | 6 k for some t ∈ N with t > 1. If |N | = t+ 1, we may assume by Step 1 that R = R(N,)
contains a non-singleton Q. Let k ∈ Q be minimal. Let A = {xk | x ∈ C+(N,, v)}. Then A = [α,∞[
for some α ∈ R. Indeed, by REAS, A has a lower bound and by closedness, there is a largest lower bound
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α. Moreover, let ℓ ∈ Q with k ≺ ℓ. Replacing xk by xk + t and xℓ by xℓ − t for any t > 0 yields another
element of C+(N,, v). Similarly, if y ∈ σ(N,, v), then by RCP applied to {k, ℓ}, we may replace yk by
yk+ t and yℓ by yℓ− t and receive another element of σ(N,, v). Also, by applying RCP to the coalition
N ′ = N \{k}, by the the inductive hypothesis, y′ = (yk, zN ′) ∈ σ(N,, v) for any zN ′ ∈ C+(N ′,, vN ′,y).
By RGP and RCP of C+, C+(N
′,, vN ′,y) = {zN ′ ∈ R
N ′ | (yk, zN ′) ∈ C+(N,, v)}. Hence, it remains
to show that σ(N,, v) contains an element x such that xk = α. Let x′ arise from x by replacing xk by
yk and xℓ by xℓ + xk − yk. Then x′ ∈ σ(N,, v) as we have shown. Now, applying RCP to {k, ℓ} allows
us to reverse this modification so that x ∈ σ(N,, v). q.e.d.
5 Characterizing the bounded positive core
This section is devoted to the characterization of the bounded positive core. Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, F =
O(N,), and R = R(N,). We may rewrite (3.3) as
Cb+(N,, v) = {x ∈ C+(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = 0 for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ}. (5.1)
Note that Cb+ inherits the following properties from C+: NE, PO, COV, AN, REAS, and CLOS. We now
define a particular subsolution of Cb+ that is single-valued and satisfies ND. Let F
∗ = O(N,∗) where
(N,∗) is the reverse order of (N,). Moreover, denote by ν the prenucleolus of the intermediate game
(R, vR). The prenucleolus of (N,, v) is the set
N (N,, v) = NUC ((e(S, ·, v∗))S∈F∗ , {y ∈ C+(N,, v) | y(Q) = νQ for Q ∈ R}) . (5.2)
Proposition 5.1 For any (N,, v) ∈ Γ, N (N,, v) is a singleton that is contained in Cb+(N,, v).
Proof: Let y ∈ C+(N,, v) such that y(Q) = νQ for all Q ∈ R and define µ∗ = max{e(S, y, v∗) | S ∈
F∗}, µ = max{e(S, y, v) | S ∈ F}, and
X = {x ∈ C+(N,, v) | x(Q) = νQ for all Q ∈ R and e(S, x, v
∗) 6 µ∗ for all S ∈ F∗}.
Then X 6= ∅ because y ∈ X . Therefore
N (N,, v) = NUC ((e(S, ·, v∗))S∈F∗ , X) .
Moreover, X is closed and convex. We now show that X is bounded. For i ∈ N let h(i) the height of i
w.r.t. (N,). Let x ∈ X . If h(i) = 0, then i ∈ F and, hence, xi > v({i})−µ. Moreover, N \ {i} ∈ F∗ so
that x(N \ {i}) > v∗(N \ {i})− µ∗, i.e., xi 6 µ
∗ + v({i}). Assume now that we have shown already that
all xi with h(i) < k for some k ∈ N are bounded. If, now, h(i) = k, then let S = {j ∈ N | j  i}. On the
one hand, xi > v(S)− µ− x(S \ {i}), hence xi has a lower bound because h(j) < k for all j ∈ S \ {i} so
that the inductive hypothesis can be applied. On the other hand xi 6 µ
∗ + v(S)− x(S \ {i}) so that xi
is bounded from above.
As the excess functions are continuous and convex, and as X is nonempty, compact, and convex, the
prenucleolus NUC ((e(S, ·, v∗))S∈F∗ , X) is a nonempty convex set such that e(S, x, v∗) = e(S, x′, v∗) for
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all S ∈ F∗ and (Justman 1977) all x, x′ ∈ N (N,, v). By induction on h∗(i), the height of i w.r.t.
(N,∗) we show that xi = x′i. Indeed, if h
∗(i) = 0, then {i} ∈ F∗ so that e({i}, x, v∗) = e({i}, x′, v∗)
implies xi = x
′
i. If h
∗(i) > 0, then, with S = {j ∈ N | j ∗ i},
e(S, x, v∗) = v∗(S)− x(S \ {i})− xi = v
∗(S)− x′(S \ {i})− x′i = e(S, x
′, v∗)
so that xi = x
′
i by the inductive hypothesis applied to j ∈ S \ {i}. Let ν(N,, v) = ν̂ denote the unique
element of N (N,, v). Moreover, let k, ℓ ∈ N such that k ≺· ℓ. Assume that t = max{e(S, ν̂, v) | S ∈
F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} < 0. Let 0 < ε < −t and let x ∈ RN only differ from ν̂ inasmuch as xk = ν̂k − ε
and xℓ = ν̂ℓ + ε. Then x ∈ X and e(T, x, v∗) < e(T, ν̂, v∗) for all T ∈ F∗ such that k /∈ T ∋ ℓ and
e(T, x, v∗) = e(T, ν̂, v∗) for all other T ∈ F∗ which is a contradiction. By (5.1), ν̂ ∈ Cb+(N,, v). q.e.d.
Remark 5.2 The solution N (·) satisfies ND because it is single-valued and satisfies AN.
We provide now a combinatorial characterization of the prenucleolus of (N,, v) by a Kohlberg-like
criterion. To this end, we introduce the following collections, for any Q ∈ R:
D′(α, x, v∗, Q) = {S ∩Q | S ∈ F∗0 , e(S, x, v
∗) > α}
E(x, v,Q) = {T ∩Q | T ∈ F0, x(T ) = v(T )} ∪ {Q},
where F∗0 = O0(N,
∗). For two collections B,B′ in 2N such that B ⊆ B′, we say that B is balanced
within B′ if there exists a collection B ⊆ C ⊆ B′ which is balanced.
Proposition 5.3 Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, and consider x ∈ C+(N,, v) s.t. x(Q) = νQ for Q ∈ R, where ν
is the prenucleolus of (R, vR). The following are equivalent:
(1) x = N (N,, v)
(2) For α > 0, Q ∈ R, y ∈ RQ, with y(Q) = 0 and y(S) 6 0 for all S ∈ D′(α, x, v∗, Q) ∪ E(x, v,Q), we
have y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ D′(α, x, v∗, Q).
(3) For α > 0 and Q ∈ R, D′ = D′(α, x, v∗, Q) is balanced within D′ ∪ E(x, v,Q).
Proposition 5.3 generalizes Kohlberg’s (1971) characterization of the nucleolus. The equivalence between
(1) and (2) is proved similarly as in the classical case. The equivalence between (2) and (3) which is an
immediate consequence of Farkas’ lemma occurs as a special case of Lemma 2.1 of Derks, Peters, and
Sudho¨lter (2014) and is, e.g., explicitly proved by Derks and Peters (1998).
By Remark 5.2 and Proposition 5.1 the bounded positive core satisfies ND. Moreover, a careful inspection
of the definition of the reduced game together with (5.1) show that, by Lemma 4.2, Cb+ also inherits RGP
from C+. Thus, C
b
+ does not satisfy RCP if |U | =∞ by Theorem 4.6.
In order to characterize the bounded positive core, the following properties of a solution σ on a set Γ′ ⊆ Γ
are useful. The solution σ satisfies
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• the converse reduced game property (CRGP) if for (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ with |N | > 2 and x ∈ X(N, v) the
following condition holds: If, for every S ⊆ N with |S| = 2, (S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ′ and xS ∈ σ(S,, vS,x),
then x ∈ σ(N,, v).
• the restricted converse reduced game property (RCRGP) if for (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ and x ∈ X(N, v), with
R = R(N,) the following condition holds: If there exists S ⊆ N such that |S ∩ Q| = 1 for all
Q ∈ R, (S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ, and xS ∈ σ(S, vS,x), and if (T , v) ∈ Γ′ and xT ∈ σ(T,, vT,x), for any
T = {k, ℓ} ⊆ N with k ≺· ℓ, then x ∈ σ(N,, v);
• the unrestricted reconfirmation property (RCPfree) if the restriction of σ to Γ′ ∩ Γfree satisfies RCP.
RCRGP has not been used in the literature. It may be interpreted as follows. If every “block”, i.e., every
connected component, may select a representative so that the coalition of representatives S is satisfied
with the preimputation x (i.e., xS ∈ σ(S, vS,x)) and if every pair of players consisting of a player ℓ and
her immediate subordinate k is also satisfied (i.e., xT ∈ σ(T,, vT,x), where T = {k, ℓ}), then no player
in the grand coalition has an objection against x (i.e., x ∈ σ(N,, v)).
As C+ satisfied RCP, C
b
+ satisfies RCP on Γ
free, i.e., Cb+ satisfies RCP
free. By (3.3), it also satisfies
BOUND.
The following result may be proved similarly to Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 5.4 The bounded positive core satisfies RCRGP.
Proof: Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, F = O(N,, v), R = R(N,), and let x ∈ X(N, v) such that x{k,ℓ} ∈
Cb+({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x) for all k, ℓ ∈ N such that k ≺· ℓ and such that there exists S ⊆ N with |Q∩S| = 1
for all Q ∈ R and xS ∈ Cb+(S, vS,x). For any i ∈ S denote Qi the connected component that contains i.
Hence, the mapping S →R, i 7→ Qi for all i ∈ S, is a bijection.
Let k, ℓ ∈ N such that k ≺· ℓ. Now, v{k,ℓ},x({k}) = v(T )− x(T \ {k}) for some T ∈ F with ℓ /∈ T ∋ k.
As x{k,ℓ} ∈ C
b
+({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x), 0 = v(T )− x(T ) = max{v(P )− x(P ) | ℓ /∈ P ∋ k, P ∈ F}.
By (3.1) and (5.1) it suffices to show that y = (x(Q))Q∈R ∈ C+(R, vR). Now, xS ∈ C+(S, vS,x). As in
the proof of Lemma 4.5, e(T, xS , vS,x)+ = e({Qi | i ∈ T }, y, vR)+ for all T ⊆ F(S) so that the proof is
finished by (3.5). q.e.d.
Remark 5.5 In the proof of Theorem 5.6 we shall employ the following stronger version Theorem 4.1
of Orshan and Sudho¨lter (2010) in which REAS is replaced by BOUND: If |U | = ∞, then the unique
solutions on Γfree that satisfy NE, BOUND, COV, RGP, and ND, are (a) the prenucleolus, (b) the positive
core, and (c) the relative interior of the positive core. This result is Theorem 4.9 of Orshan and Sudho¨lter
(2001). The article from 2010 is a modification of the discussion paper from 2001. Theorem 4.9 relies
on the lengthy and technically sophisticated proof of Lemma 4.2, whereas when replacing BOUND by
REAS, the proof of the corresponding lemma (Lemma 4.6) takes just a few lines so that the authors used
the well-accepted REAS in their 2010 article basically to offer an easier reading. In the present context,
when restrictions are possible, REAS is not implying BOUND.
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Theorem 5.6 The bounded positive core is the unique solution that satisfies NE, BOUND, COV, RGP,
RCPfree, ND, and RCRGP, provided |U | =∞.
We postpone the proof and first show a useful variant of Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 5.7 If σ is a solution that satisfies BOUND, COV, and RGP, then, for any k, ℓ ∈ N such that
k ≺·ℓ with P = {k, ℓ}, σ(P,, vP,x) = Cb(P,, vP,x) for any x ∈ σ(N,, v), which yields max{e(S, x, v) |
l 6∈ S ∋ k, S ∈ F} = 0.
Proof: Let u = vP,x. Define y ∈ RP by yk = xk − u({k}) and yℓ = xℓ + u({k})− u(P ). By RGP and
translation COV, y ∈ σ(P,, 0). By scale COV, ty ∈ σ(P,, 0) for t > 0 so that, by BOUND, y = 0,
which yields xk = max{v(S ∪ {k})− x(S) | k /∈ S ∈ F}. q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 5.6: It remains to show the uniqueness part. Let σ be a solution that satisfies the
desired properties. By Lemmas 5.7 and 4.5, σ is a subsolution of Cb+. Thus, it remains to show that
Cb+(N,, v) ⊆ σ(N,, v).
Claim: The solution σ coincides with C+ = C
b
+ on Γ
free. Recall that (M ′,′, u′) ∈ Γ of the proof
of Theorem 4.6 is defined by M ′ = {1, 2, 3}, u′(M) = 2 and u′(S) = 0 for S ∈ F ′ \ {M ′}, where
F ′ = O(M ′,′). Also, let P = {1, 3}, Q = {2, 3}, and R = {1, 2}. By NE, there exists x ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′).
As x ∈ Cb+(M
′,′, u′), x1 = 0 (by (5.1)) and 0 6 x3 6 2. If x3 > 0, then (x1, x3) ∈ C+(P, u′P,x) \
rint C+(P, u
′
P,x), and if x3 = 0, then (x2, x3) ∈ C+(Q, u
′
Q,x) \ rint C+(Q, u
′
Q,x). Hence, our claim is
valid by Remark 5.5 in any case.
Now we can finish the proof. Let x ∈ Cb+(N,, v) and choose any S ⊆ N such that |S ∩ Q| = 1 for
any Q ∈ R(N,). Then (S,) has height 0 so that the reduced game w.r.t. S belongs to Γfree. By RGP
of Cb+, xS ∈ C+(S, vS,x). Hence, by our claim xS ∈ σ(S, vS,x). Moreover, if k, ℓ ∈ N satisfy k ≺· ℓ,
then ({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x) has a single-valued bounded (positive) core by (5.1). By RGP of C
b
+, the unique
element is (xk, xℓ), i.e., xk = v{k,ℓ},x({k}). Hence, (xk, xℓ) ∈ σ({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x) by NE of σ. By RCRGP,
x ∈ σ(N,, v). q.e.d.
Remark 5.8 Assume that |U | =∞. According to Sobolev (1975), the prenucleolus is the unique solution
on Γfree that satisfies SIVA, AN, COV, and RGP. For a single-valued solution, however, RGP is equivalent
to RCP. Moreover, Orshan (1993) showed that AN may be replaced by the equal treatment property,
and Orshan and Sudho¨lter (2003) proved that the four axioms may be replaced by NE, ETP, COV,
and RCP. However, a nonempty solution on Γ that contains the prenucleolus for unrestricted games and
satisfies RGP or RCP and COV, cannot coincide with the prenucleolus on Γfree as an easy analysis of
the reduced games of (M ′,′, u′) (the game used in the proofs of the characterizations) shows. Hence,
in the foregoing sense there is no “prenucleolus” on Γ.
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6 Characterizing the positive prekernel and its bounded variant
This section is devoted to generalize the definition and characterization (Sudho¨lter and Peleg 2000) of
the positive prekernel to games with precedence constraints. Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, F = O(N,), and
R = R(N,). For x ∈ RN and k, ℓ ∈ N, k 6= ℓ, denote by skℓ(x, v) the maximum surplus of k over ℓ at x,
defined by
skℓ(x, v) = sup{e(S, x, v) | ℓ /∈ S ∋ k}.
The positive prekernel of (N,, v) is the set
PK+(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | skℓ(x, v) 6 sℓk(x, v)+ for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k 6= ℓ}. (6.1)
If the height of (N,) is not 0, i.e., if restrictions are present, then the prekernel (an element x of which,
similarly as in (6.1), has to satisfy skℓ(x, v) = sℓk(x, v)) is empty. Indeed, if k ≺ ℓ, then skℓ(x, v) ∈ R,
but sℓk(x, v) = sup ∅ = −∞. Hence, if x ∈ PK+(N,, v), then skℓ(x, v) 6 0. We conclude that
PK+(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | (x(Q))Q∈R ∈ PK+(R, vR) and e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0}. (6.2)
Thus, we define the bounded positive prekernel by
PKb+(N,, v) = {x ∈ PK+(N, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = 0 for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ}.
(6.3)
Remark 6.1 On Γfree the positive prekernel is characterized by NE, AN, REAS, the weak reduced
game property (WRGP) the definition of which differs from RGP only inasmuch as only reduced games
w.r.t. coalitions S ⊆ N with |S| 6 2 are considered, CRGP, and weak unanimity for 2-person games
(WUTPG) requiring that, applied to any 2-person game (N, v), the solution contains {x ∈ X(N, v) |
xi > v({i}) for i ∈ N}. (Sudho¨lter and Peleg 2000, Theorem 7.1)
We now show that the result mentioned in Remark 6.1 may be generalized to Γ. A solution σ on
Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies WUTPG if for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ with |N | = 2, σ(N,, v) ⊇ {x ∈ X(N, v) | xi >
v({i}) for all minimal i ∈ N}.
Proposition 6.2 The positive prekernel is characterized by NE, AN, REAS,WRGP, CRGP, andWUTPG.
Proof: By Proposition 2.4 and non-emptiness of PK+ on Γ
free, PK+ satisfies NE, and clearly it satisfies
AN and WUTPG. Moreover, REAS, RGP, and CRGP follow from (6.2) and the corresponding properties
on Γfree. In order to show the uniqueness part, let σ be a solution that satisfies the desired properties.
By WRGP applied to 1-person reduced games and REAS, σ satisfies PO. Morever, for any (N, v) ∈ Γfree,
σ(N, v) = PK+(N, v) by the mentioned classical result. If (N,, v) ∈ Γ \ Γfree, then |N | > 2. If |N | = 2,
then by PO and REAS, σ(N,, v) ⊆ PK+(N,, v). By WUTPG, σ(N,, v) = PK+(N,, v). If |N | > 2
and x ∈ σ(N,, v), then, by WRGP of σ, xS ∈ σ(S,, vS,x), and hence, xS ∈ PK+(S,, vS,x), for all
16
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S ⊆ N with |S| = 2. By CRGP of PK+, x ∈ PK+(N,, v). The opposite inclusion follows similarly by
interchanging the roles of σ and PK+. q.e.d.
The bounded positive prekernel inherits NE, AN, REAS, RGP, and CRGP from the positive preker-
nel. Hence, the bounded variant exclusively violates WUTPG of the axioms in Proposition 6.2, i.e.,
PKb+(N,, v) is a singleton whenever |N | = 2 and (N,) has not height 0. Hence, we note that the
bounded positive prekernel is characterized by NE, AN, REAS, WRGP, CRGP, WUTPGfree (requiring
that the core is contained in the solution applied to any classical 2-person game), and BOUND.
Here, REAS cannot be deleted. Indeed, let t > 0 and, define the following solution σ by the requirement
that x ∈ σ(N,, v) if skℓ(x, v) 6 (sℓk(x, v))+ for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k 6= ℓ, and maxi∈S 6∋j,S∈F e(S, x, v) = 0 for
all i, j ∈ N, i ≺ j, and v(N)− t 6 x(N) 6 v(N), then PKb+ is a subsolution of σ that, hence, satisfies NE
and WUTPGfree. Also, it satisfies BOUND and AN and the remaining properties (WRGP and CRGP)
are easily deduced as well. However, σ does not coincide with PKb+ already for 1-person games.
7 On the logical independence of the employed axioms
By generalizing or slightly modifying the solution concepts σ1, . . . , σ5 of Orshan and Sudho¨lter (2010,
Sect. 4.1), we will show that each of the axioms (1) NE, (2) REAS (respectively, BOUND), (3) COV,
(4) RGP, (5) RCP (respectively, RCPfree) in Theorem 4.6 or Theorem 5.6, respectively, is logically
independent of the remaining axioms. Indeed, for any (N,, v) ∈ Γ with F = O(N,), R = R(N,),
and µ = maxT ⊆R e(T , ν(R, vR), vR), let
σ1(N,, v) = C(N,, v);
σ1b(N,, v) = Cb(N,, v);
σ2(N,, v) = X(N,, v);
σ3(N,, v) = NUC((max{e(S, ·, v), t})S∈F , X(N, v)) for some t < 0;
σ3b(N,, v) = {x ∈ σ3(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = t for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ};
σ4(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | e(T , (x(Q))Q∈R, vR) 6 µ for T ⊆ R and e(S, x, v) 6 0 for S ∈ F0};
s4b(N,, v) = {x ∈ σ4(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = 0 for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ};
σ5(N,, v) = PK+(N,, v); and
σ5b(N,, v) = PKb+(N,, v).
Then it is easy to check that σi satisfies all axioms from (1) to (5) except (i), for all i = 1, . . . , 5, and
similarly for σib and the bounded version of the axioms. Also, as mentioned, rint C+ satisfies all axioms
of Theorem 4.6 except CLOS. The solutions σ1 and σ1b, respectively, also show that NE is logically
independent in the characterization of the positive prekernel (Proposition 6.1) and its bounded variant.
Similarly, the (bounded) positive core has all properties except CRGP and the correspondence X only
violates REAS in Proposition 6.2. The solution that assigns the positive prekernel to each (N,, v) with
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|N | 6 2 and otherwise the set of all reasonable preimputations only violates WRGP, and its bounded
variant may be used to show that RGP is independent of the remaining axioms in the characterization
of the bounded positive prekernel. We now generalize the definition of the solution of Example 8.3 of the
aforementioned article. Choose two players, say 1 and 2 and define, for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ, σ6(N,, v) =
PK+(N,, v) if |N | ≤ 2 and {1, 2} 6⊆ N or C(N,, v) 6= ∅. If N = {1, 2} and C(N,, v) = ∅ (hence the
height of (N,) is 0), put σ6(N,, v) = PK(N, v) ∪ {(v({1}), v(N)− v({1})), (v(N)− v({2}), v({2}))}.
For |N | > 3, put σ6(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | xS ∈ σ6(S,, vS,x) for all S ⊆ N, |S| = 2} and let σ6b be
its bounded pendant. Hence,
σ6(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | (x(Q))Q∈R ∈ σ
6(R, vR), e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0} and
σ6b(N,, v) = {x ∈ σ6(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = 0 for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ}.
As in the classical case, σ6 (respectively, σ6b) satisfies NE, REAS (respectively, BOUND), RGP, CRGP,
and WUTPG (respectively, WUTPGfree); and it violates AN.
Let t > 0 and
σ7(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | skℓ(x, v) 6 max{−t, sℓk(x, v)} for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k 6= ℓ}.
Then σ7 exclusively violates WUTPG and the variant defined by
σ7b(N,, v) = {x ∈ σ6(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = −t for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ}
satisfies the remaining axioms of the bounded positive prekernel.
We don’t know if ND is logically independent of the remaining axioms in the characterizing result of the
(bounded) positive core. We remark that NE is logically independent of NE, REAS (BOUND), COV,
and RGP on Γfree (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010), i.e., there are solutions that satisfy NE, REAS, COV,
and RGP, and do neither coincide with the prenucleolus nor with the positive core or its relative interior.
But as soon as an axiom is added that guarantees that the positive core is the only solution that has also
this property, then it is an open problem whether or not ND is still needed.
Moreover, we have to admit that we don’t know whether RCRGP is logically independent of the remaining
axioms in Theorem 5.6.
Finally, examples of the mentioned paper may be generalized to show that the infinity assumption on |U |
is necessary in the characterization of the (bounded) positive core and that for |U | = 2 the statement of
Proposition 6.2 is no longer valid.
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